Is R.D. Laing's Concept of Ontological Insecurity Applicable Beyond Schizophrenic Experience?

Abstract

Reading The Divided Self, I was struck by how relevant R.D.Laing's concept of ontological insecurity seemed to my own experience. How did a concept intended to explain schizophrenia echo my own feelings of insecurity and uncertainty towards the world? Given the opportunity to explore this issue in a term assignment, I found that others had sensed their own resonance with Laing's concept and believed that it had relevance for forms of mental distress more common than psychosis. This paper examines that relevance by concentrating on the two approaches that Laing introduces to understand schizophrenia: existentialism and object relations. I suggest that the former, while it offers some important insights, is less relevant to that perceived universality. The firmest application of the concept beyond schizophrenic experience is due to Laing's use of object-relations. The paper then looks at Laing's later development of ontological insecurity of the self in relation to others. I reach the conclusion that although less precise than its previous manifestation, the concept nonetheless resonated with readers on account of the schizoid nature of modern society. Finally, the paper touches on the relevance of Laing's own schizoid state to the development of the concept, and the influence of his own humanity in articulating it in such a fashion as to be relevant beyond the experience of schizophrenia.