Book Review: Plato, Not Prozac!: applying philosophy to everyday problems

Lou Marinoff's new book is a welcome addition to the few other books on philosophical counselling ('philosophical practice') available at this time. It has the evident purpose of introducing philosophical counselling as something people with life problems can benefit from either by consulting a philosophical counsellor or by using his five-step 'PEACE' method to resolve their problems by themselves. Thus it is largely a kind of self-help manual, which not only lays out a method (identify the Problem, take stock of one's Emotions, Analyse one's options for solving the problem, Contemplate one's entire situation and, finally, reach Equilibrium), but discusses numerous cases where the method is more or less applied. Marinoff admits that not all practitioners of philosophical counselling (such as Gerd Achenbach) agree that there can be any definite method applied in philosophical counselling; and it is clear from the several case studies provided by other philosophical counsellors that there are indeed a variety of different methods and strategies. Marinoff himself apparently would agree with Socrates that it is important to 'know oneself' and that 'the unexamined life' is an unwise life. He also mentions 'bibliotherapy' (assigning readings from philosophical texts such as the I Ching, to clients) and makes clear that integral to his actual application of the 'PEACE' method of philosophical counselling is not only discussion of major philosophers' views, but also forthright declaration by the philosophical counsellor of his own philosophical position. Indeed, Marinoff himself is occasionally not only candid about his own philosophical views, but even verges on the dogmatic; an example is when he states (p. 280), regarding Hobbes (a philosopher whom he often cites and obviously admires) that, 'His view of humans as supremely egotistic, wildly passionate, easily misguided, constantly power hungry, and therefore highly dangerous beings was enormously unpopular but apparently sound.' In addition, Marinoff and others whose case studies are presented, do not shy away from giving outright advice to troubled clients. Many of Marinoff's philosophical views regarding life, love, death, etc. in fact strike me as quite sound - even wise; for example, in a chapter on 'Seeking a Relationship' (p. 88) Marinoff applies Taoist and Buddhist philosophy in the case of a client named Doug. 'There is such a thing as trying too hard, or trying at the wrong time, to obtain your heart's desire. Strive for less desire and better timing. In terms of meeting people, your timing is often best when you're not striving at all. Stop seeking, and you will find. And if you don't find, you won't mind because you're not seeking.' I also agree with his idea that philosophical counselling can serve as a kind of preventive regimen, preventing conceptual confusions from developing into major life problems. In one of his case studies, Marinoff demonstrates convincingly how a professional philosopher's analytic skills can help clear up confusion and resolve life problems - in this case by analysing and clarifying the difference between 'being harmed' and 'taking offence'.

An issue among the many theoreticians and practitioners of philosophical counselling on which consensus has not yet been reached is whether or not to strictly avoid the 'medical model' (i.e. avoid referring to clients as 'patients' with 'presenting symptoms', in need of 'therapy'). While Marinoff on the one hand argues that many problems people face are not psychopathological and that philosophical counselling should be seen as a useful alternative to psychotherapy and psychiatry, he several times refers openly to his own practice of philosophical counselling as 'therapy', and once (p. 76) even refers to clients' 'presenting symptoms' (e.g., absurdity, nausea, dread).

Marinoff's manual for philosophical first aid is divided into four main parts: Part I ('New Uses for Ancient Wisdom') is a general theoretical discussion of philosophical counselling and includes a compact introduction to some of the mainstreams of Eastern and Western philosophy (not to be unduly criticised for its oversimplification, as some reviewers have done, since it was written as a very brief introduction to philosophy for non-experts); Part II ('Managing Everyday Problems') constitutes the bulk of his book (pp. 83-256), and is devoted to illustrating how philosophical counselling works with numerous case studies; Part III ('Beyond Client Counselling') explains how philosophical counselling works with groups and organisations, such as philosopher's cafes, in 'Socratic Dialogue,' and the role of the 'corporate philosopher' as consultant to companies and governments; Part IV ('Additional Resources') is composed of five appendices: Appendix A is a witty, short, survey of the main ideas of sixty or so key philosophers; Appendix B is a kind of advertisement for a few professional societies for the advancement of philosophical counselling, two of which Marinoff took a leading role in founding; Appendix C is a directory of philosophical counsellors from many countries around the world; Appendix D, 'Further Reading' is a short list of selected books and journals related to philosophical counselling; Appendix E is an interesting, brief introduction to the I Ching (Book of Changes) and how it can be used in philosophical counselling.

In Part III, on the subject of philo-cafes, Marinoff boldly and eloquently states (p. 260): 'We take on issues of race, sex, justice, religion, liberty, money, drugs, education, and other topics that are becoming difficult if not impossible to examine openly and sincerely in our increasingly politically correct society.' As he says, 'The guiding purpose of these groups is to discuss things that don't otherwise get discussed.' His explanation of how Socratic Dialogue works (as developed especially by Dutch philosophical counsellors such as Ida Jongsma and Dries Boele) is accurate, but his example of the conclusion of such a dialogue ('hope is acting on an expectation for a preferred outcome consistent with one's current life situation') is, to me at least, tortured and unconvincing. However, his discussion of the philosopher in the market place (the 'corporate philosopher') I find surprisingly convincing, as when he argues (pp. 268-9) that, 'Formerly the vital linkage was between human bodies and solid machines... Now the vital linkage has changed: it's between human minds and fluid, often amorphous structures, like cyberspace. So the operational question becomes "How do you best systematise human performance?" Answer: "Hire a philosophical consultant and she'll tell you."'

At various points in his book Marinoff articulates sound insights. For example, he says (p. 146), 'The key in deciding for another is to set one's own personal gains and losses aside'; this life strategy is echoed (p. 232) again in a remark under the section, 'Help Yourself By Helping Someone Else': 'Feeling that life is meaningless is in a sense a luxury'. Elsewhere, Marinoff reminds us of lessons learned from Zen: live in the moment; taking care of mundane chores restores one's sense of meaning; and, to live well one needs a conception of how everything fits together - 'Finding that unity is what allows you to put a problem behind you'. Like Marinoff (p. 172), I also have argued that, 'Perhaps what you are supposed to be doing just now is not knowing what you are supposed to be doing just now.' Or, as he says on the same page: '[T]here's a time to know what you are doing and a time not to know.'

One thing I appreciate about Marinoff's book is that he very frequently cites Chinese philosophy (especially the I Ching), in pounding his own philosophy of life, and demonstrates how Chinese philosophy can be applied in philosophical counselling. His understanding of Chinese (and Hindu and Buddhist) philosophy is generally sound and reliable, as when he remarks (p. 56) that, 'Chinese philosophy centres on the quest for how to lead a good life'. However, Marinoff has a tendency to over-generalise, as when he states (p. 56), Tao is "the Way," signifying the way things unfold'. The concept word 'Tao' has rather different meanings in Taoism and Confucianism; in the former it is more or less accurate to characterise it as denoting 'the Way things unfold', whereas in the latter it has the ethical meaning of 'the Way things ought to unfold', or the way of human moral and social self-cultivation. Similarly, Marinoff states (p. 83) that, 'Chinese philosophy teaches that endings are contained within beginnings', and (p. 107), 'Chinese thinkers held as a central concept that opposites are interconnected, relying on one another to complement their mutual existence'. But while these two related ideas are prominent in Taoism (Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu), as well as the I Ching, they are not prominent in Confucianism or Legalism, which recognise that all humans are indeed interconnected on a social nexus, but which deny that moral goodness and evil (or, endings and beginnings) are interconnected in the way Marinoff states. Marinoff has an unscholarly tendency to lump all schools of Chinese philosophy together, as though there were no important differences between them. His frequent generalisations about 'Chinese philosophy' are as hazardous as would be similar generalisations about 'German philosophy' or 'Greek philosophy'. Certainly one can make such generalisations, but one must be cautious and sensitive to significant exceptions. Another example is when Marinoff several times states that according to 'Chinese philosophy' the key to a good life lies in remaining 'blameless'. In my opinion this is an odd and inaccurate generalisation. I think he has been much influenced by the I Ching, the standard translation of which (Wilhelm/Baynes, Princeton University Press) often renders the Chinese word chiu as 'blame', as in the phrase wu chiu ('blameless'), but this notion of 'blamelessness' is not otherwise prominent in Chinese philosophy. There are other misleading statements, as when (p. 100) he says, 'The I Ching is not, as some misconceive it, a fortune-telling device. It is a storehouse of great wisdom, and it mirrors the inner workings of your own mind.' While the second statement above is correct (and is elaborated on in his useful and accurate explanation in Appendix E on how the I Ching can be used in philosophical counselling), the first statement is simply false: the I Ching is and always has been a tool for divination/prognostication ('fortune-telling'), as well as a book of ethics and metaphysics. Regarding the Taoist philosopher, Chuang Tzu, Marinoff incorrectly states (p. 278), 'He sought ways to lead a life of benevolence and righteousness.' In fact, Chuang Tzu (like Lao Tzu before him) explicitly warns against all efforts to be 'benevolent' (jen) or 'righteous' (yi), since such efforts often backfire. Marinoff also misleadingly (p. 54) suggests that Buddhism is an unorthodox 'branch' of Hinduism, and elsewhere (p. 84) states that 'The great religions all give moral guidance originating from a divine power.' This is simply not true if one includes Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism among the world's great religions. Perhaps I am a bit too critical of Marinoff's presentation of 'Chinese philosophy', considering that I advised reviewers not to be overly critical of his concise introduction to numerous Western philosophers.

Of particular interest to readers of this journal might be a brief comparison of Lou Marinoff's version/vision of philosophical counselling with existential analysis (as explained and practised by prominent therapists such as Ernesto Spinelli and Emmy van Deurzen). Beyond the fact that existential analysis (/therapy/counselling) is similar to philosophical counselling insofar as it is the most philosophical kind of therapeutic counselling, another important similarity is that philosophical counselling (as Marinoff conceives and practices it), like existential analysis, recognises that it is the unique bond or relationship between counsellor and client which is beneficial to the client, rather than any particular theoretical orientation or 'intervention'. To employ Spinelli's distinction between 'being' and 'doing', what counts is not so much what is said or done, but the counsellor's 'way of being'. Sharing one's way of 'being-in-the-world' and attempting to enter into the client's own way of 'being-in-the-world' can also be more risky for the counsellor than Marinoff seems to realise in his own sterilised method of reasoning with the client. Furthermore, Marinoff's references to the 'style of the therapist' (p. 34) as being more important than 'expertise', leave one wondering how this fits in with his overall PEACE method. Another similarity between Marinoff (and other philosophical counsellors) and existential analysis is that both aim at 'clarifying the client's values and worldviews' (as Freddie Strasser puts it in Simon du Plock's anthology of case studies), and exposing assumptions, discrepancies and contradictions the client may be living out, in order to aid the client in gaining greater 'Socratic' self-knowledge, and thereby making life more 'meaningful'. It is noteworthy that Marinoff takes no clear stand on the notion of a 'self', whereas Spinelli, for example, sees the client's insight into his 'self-construct' as essential for clarifying the client's way of relating to others and himself. As I understand it, existential analysis seeks to free the client from 'sedimented' values and patterns of behaviour, and assist the client in recovering 'authenticity' (full awareness of one's freedom, responsibility, options, finitude, and 'fate' - Geworfenheit). Whereas existential analysis employs the phenomenological method of 'bracketing' the counsellor's own values, biases, assumptions, etc. in order to experience and understand as fully as possible the client's subjective Eigenwelt, and as a 'client-centred' approach may challenge or confront the client, but does not indulge in direct giving of advice, Marinoff does not even mention phenomenology and clearly is in the business of directly advising his clients (and readers) on how to change themselves and their worldviews and values in order to live, love, and die well. Unlike Spinelli and many other existential analysts, Marinoff does not extensively employ the strategy of 're-phrasing' or 'mirroring' the client's narrative, or the existential-phenomenological approach of asking 'What is it like to have this experience, this emotion?' Like Spinelli and others (but unlike van Deurzen, who affirms that the counsellor must be the client's 'ally' and has a duty to try to understand the client, but no duty to invest emotion in the relationship with the client), Marinoff puts emphasis on empathy, and of course careful listening.

Further, if I may risk another generalisation, it seems to me that whereas Spinelli's case studies, like Marinoff's (and those in du Plock's fine anthology), show existential analysts and philosophical counsellors as striving to assist clients in dealing with particular problems or crises, van Deurzen suggests that the aim of existential analysis (at least as she practices it and writes about it) is to help the client recover lost dreams and projects, recollecting what it is for the client that makes life worth living, and what matters most to the client. Another point of comparison: whereas Spinelli, van Deurzen, and Marinoff all in varying degrees see that life often presents us with unavoidable paradoxes, Marinoff appears to be acting under the assumption that logic and rationality can usually prevail, life can be made sense of, and life problems solved through rational thought and discourse, with no residue of existential dilemmas. A final noteworthy difference between philosophical counselling as practised by Marinoff (and others), is that philosophical counsellors often see clients for only one or two sessions, whereas existential analysis do not generally engage in such brief therapy (seeing clients for many sessions, perhaps more than a year).

Nietzsche noted, long before Husserl, that all one can ever hope to attain are interpretations of whatever phenomenon is at hand. I hope that my own interpretations and generalisations, regarding Lou Marinoff's philosophy of philosophical counselling and Spinelli's and van Deurzen's versions of existential analysis, are not too far off the mark.

As Schopenhauer (or somebody) once remarked, it is far easier to criticise an author's ideas than it is to fully understand and appreciate them. In reviewing a book, it is also a good idea to keep in mind its intended readership. As a book for the general public, I think Lou Marinoff's Plato, Not Prozac! should at the very least stir up interest (with its mordant wit, as well as its ideas and case studies), and provoke much thoughtful discussion among 'experts'.

Jess Fleming