Book Review: Heidegger and Being and Time

Stephen Mulhall states the purpose of his book, Heidegger and Being and Time, as being an introduction to Heidegger's text, Being and Time, rather than as an exploration of Heidegger, the philosopher, or the philosophical problems raised by Heidegger's work. Mulhall's book, consequently, does not provide a criticism of Heidegger, nor does it consider the criticisms of others. However, he does acknowledge that his book is an "…an interpretation of Being and Time which makes the strongest case in its favour…" (p. xi). One of the strengths of this book is that it allows the reader to explore exclusively the themes dealt with in Being and Time, and is not a philosophical justification or argument which aims to support or refute Heidegger. Mulhall's introduction to Heidegger's project begins by examining what Heidegger means by the term 'Being' and Heidegger's reasons for refocusing philosophical attention on this subject. Mulhall then provides an exploration of the use of the term 'Dasein' and why, for Heidegger's purposes, the terms human being, consciousness, or subjectivity do not accurately represent what Heidegger is wanting to analyse. Mulhall closes his introduction by placing Heidegger's work in its historical context. He provides some background to Heidegger's original plan for Being and Time to be a much larger piece of work. The remainder of Mulhall's book is separated into eight chapters. The first four chapters deal with the issues raised in Division One of Heidegger's Being and Time - the existential analytic of Dasein, and the following four chapters centre on the issues found in Division Two - Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's Being in terms of temporality. Each chapter addresses a Heideggerian idea, such as being-in-the-world as opposed to objects confronting one another, the concept of other persons, and language.

Mulhall highlights clearly for the reader his own particular biases when interpreting a Heideggerian idea. For the majority of the book I found Mulhall's writing style to be accessible; however, this book is not for the entirely philosophically naïve. Mulhall explains that, as it was Heidegger's belief that the reliance on the epistemological tradition had "…seriously distorted philosophers' characterizations of human existence in the world.", Heidegger, therefore, needed to analyse those theories which he was challenging through his writing (p. 39). It is for this reason that the reader finds the work of Kant, Descartes, and Hume being examined in Mulhall's book. It is possible to avoid Heidegger's reply to the arguments made by scepticism or his examination of the Cartesian model of the mind. However, by doing so, the reader will then lose sight of the context and the historical importance of Heidegger's philosophical challenge.

If, like me, readers struggle with Heidegger's Being and Time, then this book is ideal. It discusses the themes of Being and Time in a systematic manner. Plenty of examples of how the themes are applied to daily life are provided. This makes the book useful for reference purposes, either when wanting to consult a particular issue raised in Being and Time, or purely as a student aid to understanding existential concepts. Although this book is obviously an academic book I believe that the psychotherapist who is interested in philosophy, and in particular existential philosophy, can gain much through reading this book. Mulhall's book was not written with psychotherapy in mind, but it would still be a valuable book to have on one's bookcase. The themes, such as authenticity, freedom, and temporality are explored in considerable detail. This is not only helpful for the student attempting to understand existential concepts, but also for the psychotherapist who wishes to gain a more thorough understanding of existential ideas. Psychotherapy literature, in its effort to explain the philosophical concept of, for example, authenticity, sometimes resorts to over-simplification. Understandable as this is, the danger is that authenticity becomes solely an aim or task of psychotherapy, rather than a way of examining one's mode of being-in-the-world. For this reason I often gain more through the reading of academic books than the teach-you-how-to psychotherapy books. Readers similar to myself will obtain much from reading this book. It was Heidegger's intention to make existential demands on both himself and his readers. The re-reading of the chapters on authenticity, not only challenged my sedimented views on the concept, but also provoked me to think more deeply about my authenticity (or inauthenticity) with my clients. The book certainly helped me through the writing of my dissertation, and added to my thoughts about the practice of psychotherapy. It is not always an easy book to follow, but I would still go ahead in recommending it to readers.

Rachel Beasley