Book Review: Clinical Phenomenology and Cognitive Psychology

The relationship between thought and emotion remains a crucial quandary for both philosophy and cognitive science. Psychologists, since the rise of cognitive models derived from information-processing hypotheses, have tended to view the emotions as outcomes shaped by verbally-mediated thought activity. More recently, some authors have suggested that the opposite view may be just as likely, if not more helpful. Whatever the stance taken, its impact upon cognitive approaches to mental disturbance and dysfunction remains pivotal and problematic.

As an alternative system to such positivist-dominated methodologies, contemporary phenomenology posits a view which holds thought and emotion as complementary, mutually-influencing processes. As such, when placed within the realm of 'clinical' interventions, 'felt' experience and its interpreted meaning are taken to be as significant as the concomitant behaviours which can be more easily placed into a diagnostic framework. To employ the jargon: the noetic context of experience - be it functional or dysfunctional - is given equal significance to the noematic features emphasised by cognitive psychology.

That cognitive approaches have been unable or unwilling to address 'feeling states' as differentiable components of mental disturbance remains a central critique of cognitive psychology that has been voiced, among others, by a number of phenomenological psychologists. It is, therefore, a substantial development that the two authors of this text have sought to address this impasse and to provide a number of tentative, though by no means insubstantial, steps towards its (partial) resolution. In doing so, they have written an important text that deserves the attention - and applause - of both cognitive and phenomenological psychologists.

While the total number of text pages is under 200, the sheer volume of detailed information packed into the ten chapters demands that the book be read slowly and with care. It does not make easy reading - but, at the same time, the challenge of perseverance is both rewarding and illuminating.

Readers of this Journal will find much of interest in the text's first chapter which provides an exemplary analysis of a number of key phenomenological arguments. Knowing full well how difficult these can be to convey to an audience that is likely to find such both novel and complex, I was deeply impressed by the clarity of the exposition. The five densely-packed pages summarising Jaspers' development of clinical phenomenology, to take but one example, should be read by all students of existential analysis. In a similar fashion, chapter three provides an invaluable outline of descriptively-focused analyses of the emotions. Chapters four through eight focus upon the examination of a number of major clinically-labelled dysfunctions - such as panic disorder (chapter four), psychogenic dizziness (chapter five), depersonalisation phenomena (chapter six), craving and addiction (chapter seven) and misidentification (chapter eight) - from both cognitive and phenomenologically-informed perspectives. Some readers may find the many (sometimes too many) reference sources cited to be as overly intrusive as they are helpful. And while the authors provide highly useful summaries at the end of each chapter, I must confess that, at times, I regretted that they did not choose to be more selective - and personally 'present' - in their discussions. While the final chapter provides a clear and constructive investigation of the potential 'common ground' between phenomenological and cognitive psychology, I would have appreciated an equally perceptive summary of the remaining points and issues of divergence and disagreement which remain.

Overall, however, I wish to impress upon the readers how much I admired this book. Without doubt, it opens pathways to mutually beneficial discourse. For those among us whose desire it is to develop phenomenological psychology so that it can more adequately address the principal concerns of psychology amongst which is that of 'psychopathology' - this text can be seen to be a much-needed starting point. That it raises more questions than it provides solutions should not be taken as an overtly negative criticism: it has mapped out (some of) the terrain and, if for this alone, demands our acknowledgement and respect.

I recommend this text to all 'explorers' and look forward to future advancements in dialogue between cognitive and phenomenological psychologies. If such are forthcoming, as I expect they will - indeed, must - be, they will be enhanced significantly by the groundwork that Clinical Phenomenology and Cognitive Psychology has provided.

Ernesto Spinelli