Book Review: Self & Identity: Psychosocial perspectives

*Self & Identity: Psychosocial perspectives edited by Krysia Yardley and Terry Honess, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, (1987) 332 pp.

*First Person Plural: multiple personality and the philosophy of mind by Stephen E. Braude, Routledge, London (1991) 283 pp.

At the 1993 BPS Psychotherapy Section Conference, one of the invited speakers asserted that the study of 'the self' would soon prove to become, once again, a focus for psychological interest and that those of us interested in the implications of psychological inquiry upon psychotherapeutic practice and research would do well to clarify and perhaps reconsider our assumptions of 'the self'. For several years now, I have, myself, become increasingly convinced that not only is phenomenological-existential theory crucial to developing theories of 'the self' but also that, reciprocally, the clarification of our understanding of 'the self' is essential to the development of an existentially-derived and focused therapeutic practice. The starting point, of course, is for each of us to expose and confront the biases and assumptions we bring to our notions of self (or selves) and to reconsider such from the standpoint of the intersubjective, or 'self/ves as relation(s)' viewpoint espoused by many modern phenomenologically-influenced theorists. Both of the texts under review supply valuable assistance for this task.

Self and Identity contains twenty-four papers, separated into four equal sections which focus upon Metatheoretical Commentaries; Self And Social Structure; Cognitive, Affective and Contextual Aspects of Self;

and Disordered And Precarious Selves. Overall, the standard of presentation and critical discussion is excellent, with each paper providing an account of a particular 'take' on self studies that avoids any sense of repetition of other papers' arguments and views yet which gains greater relevance through its contrast and connections with the other presentations. Indeed, the text as a whole strikes me as an apt metaphor for the self in that each paper is both unique, distinct and provides an incomplete definition of its subject and yet, at the same time, an underlying, seemingly ineffable continuity and connectedness between the papers as a whole also not only exists but imbues each with added significance. The two editors are to be congratulated for their careful and well considered planning of the structure of the text. I am certain that as an interest in self studies increases, their text will become an important reference source. Of particular interest to the Journal readership is the fact that a number of authors are either existentially-informed or, as in the case of Norman Denzin and Robert Romanyshyn are highly respected phenomenologists. Both their papers are of great relevance to Phenomenological thinking about 'the self'. Denzin's paper explores the phenomenology of the emotionally divided self as "the beautiful soul" which cultivates a particular moral individualism that sets it above and apart from others, thereby cutting itself off from society" (p 288), and focuses on four principal structures - others, self and body, situations and temporality as distinguishing features of this stance. Romanyshyn's paper begins with a case study through which he presents his notion of mirror as metaphor of psychological life and, more specifically, the world as mirror of self. The paper is beautifully-written, concise, yet manages to raise significant Phenomenological critiques of notions of reality, the past and remembering. Although both these papers appear in the final section of the text, I would not wish to de-emphasise the remaining three sections - especially the first which, as well as provide an excellent historical overview by Richard Logan on Western assumptions concerning the self and a challenging paper by Anand Paranjpe which contrasts Western views of the self with a number from Eastern thought, also provides two crucial papers (Rom Harre's 'The social construction of selves' (pp 41-5-) and Kenneth Gergen's 'Toward self as relationship' (pp 53-64) that seem to beg for Phenomenological analysis and dialogue. Each section is well-served by the editors who provide critical summaries of each paper as well as important commentary.

Where Yardley and Honess's text provides the reader with a multiplicity of, often conflicting views of the self, Stephen Braude's First Person Plural follows the critical thought, argument and conclusions of a single author. Braude is a philosopher whose interests extend to the study and

analysis of paranormal phenomena such as ESP and psychokinesis which he has written about and examined philosophically. Some of these concerns, principally automatic writing and mediumship, as well as hypnosis (which was also once considered a paranormal phenomenon) crop up in this text. As interesting as the first two topics are, I wish that Braude (or his editor) had refrained from dealing with them quite to the extent that he does; while they are clearly relevant to his philosophical analysis of multiple personalities, they do not seem to add much to the many and pertinent points he raises and, instead, succeed in distracting this reader away from the major themes of the text. This is a great shame since the text, as a whole, is not only fascinating in its analysis and account of the emergence and explanation of multiple personalities as 'disorders', but, more significantly, it raises and addresses a number of issues focused on our notions and assumptions of unified minds and selves. In particular, Braude provides an excellent summary of the concept of 'dissociation' emphasising the work and theoretical divergences of Pierre Janet, Morton Prince and Ernest Hilgard and, as well, providing a philosophical critique of their conclusions and of the various other attempts to define this highly useful, if problematic, term. Indeed, the text as a whole may be read as a philosophical critique of (principally psychological) attempts to define 'the person' and 'personality', the confusions that have arisen and which continue to infuse current research, and how the study of 'multiple personalities' can clarify these confusions and, as well, provide the possibility for more philosophically informed analyses. Throughout, the text is clearly and engagingly written. I certainly learned a lot from it and, while I am not quite in agreement with a number of Braude's conclusions (in particular with those dealing with the unity underlying multiplicity) I have no reservation in recommending this text not only to those readers and practitioners interested in multiple personality studies but also to those concerned with the broader 'self-related' issues that such studies raise.

Ernesto Spinelli