Book Review: Living & Relating: an introduction to phenomenology

* Living & Relating: an introduction to phenomenology by Carol S. Becker, Sage, London (1992) 289pp.

When I first heard of this text, and read segments of the highly positive reviews it received by such luminaries as Maurice Friedman, Robert Romanyshyn and Constance Fischer, I became both highly intrigued and excited. Sadly, having now read the book, I have to report that I was both deeply disappointed by it and more than a little confused by the reviewers' comments. In all honesty, I can't really think of anyone I would wish to recommend this text to.

Its central weakness, I think, lies in its unwillingness (or inability) to introduce the central theoretical themes of phenomenology. The concepts of 'being-in-the-world', 'intentionality', 'co-constitutionality', 'thrownness' and 'situated freedom' (as well as several other key notions), are all swiftly dealt with in eleven pages of text! Worse, many of these notions are presented in such a simplistic manner that they ultimately mislead the naive reader into a false, and limited (limiting) understanding. Intentionality, for instance is so confused with the idea of 'having intentions' that it requires a reader with previous knowledge of the term to make sense of Dr Becker's descriptive definition. Similarly, her discussion on the 'co-constitution of meaning' makes no mention of phenomenologists' critique of the subject-object split and its implications for our notions of reality. As to the idea of situated freedom, here is what the author has to say about it:

What are examples of situated freedom? Some people are single-minded in their life chokes. You can for example, decide to do well in a college class, then you go to class, read assignments, clarify misunderstandings, and review class notes. Others may not be so single-minded. They may want to do well in class but also want to see friends and have fun, then study time gets absorbed by other activities. If we say we want to do one thing and find ourselves doing others instead, we should look more carefully at the confluence of our life choices. Clarifying our desires will help us accomplish the multifaceted plane of our life. (pp21-2).

It's that simple! But where is the anxiety of situated freedom? Where is the understanding of freedom within the limitations of the life-world? Where is the constant conflict and risk and disappointment that shadows every choice we make and moment of felt aliveness in our being?

To be fair on the author, she attempts, in the second part of her text, to provide a Phenomenological account of human development - something implicit in Phenomenological theory that really needs to be made much more explicit. Unfortunately, here, too, the account is somewhat superficial, at best a sketch that others, hopefully, will fill out someday. The bulk of the text deals with accounts of different relations in human experience which the author labels as 'intimate relationships' (eg. parents and children, friendships, sexual love relationships) and 'helping relationships' (eg. psychotherapy, helping the physically ill person, relational aspects of college teaching). Again, a very worthy and important exercise. And, as well, it is not so much what the author writes about these aspects of relationships that I find myself bothered by or in disagreement with, but, rather, it is what she leaves out. Interestingly, her discussions focus on relationships with other human beings; she says

next to nothing about self-self relations (other than at the level of our relationships with our bodies) nor about self-world relationships. Even in the discussion on Phenomenological research, the section of the text that I valued the most, the author's account suggests an easy-goingness, even sloppiness, in methodological thought and structure that simply does not equate with the rigor and careful preparation and exposition of data that exemplifies this approach and which makes it such a viable alternative to (and critique of) more standard, quantitatively-focused research methodologies.

I also find it inconceivable that an up-to-date text such as this one is manages to avoid mention, much less discussion, of Emmy van Deurzen-Smith's pertinent contributions to existential-phenomenological thought and practice - especially as both authors are published by the same publisher!

In 1981, the songwriter Bob Dylan recorded a song entitled 'Watered-Down Love'. Its focus is on the unwillingness on the part of many to acknowledge the danger, the despair, the conflict and the uncertainty that the willingness to love unleashes in them and, instead, to confine their experienced attitudes and views to the superficial, the safe, ultimately to those features which if considered complete unto themselves will only misconstrue and stultify the experience and deny the possibility of a more adequate and liberating understanding of the concept. I believe that Dylan's critique of this view of love is pertinent to Dr Becker's text. It should have been titled 'Watered-Down Phenomenology'.

Ernesto Spinelli