Book Review: The Freudian Metaphor: Toward Paradigm Change in Psychoanalysis

In 1982 Donald Spence published Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis which continues to provoke debate and influence informed criticism of classical psychoanalysis. The Freudian Metaphor is a worthy sequel to that significant work. It is severely critical of the lingering presumption that classical psychoanalytic theory is a thoroughly scientific discipline in pursuit of discoverable knowledge of the mind and its contents. What if such knowledge is provisional and in fact created heuristically by both analyst and analysand within the context of their unusual and temporary relationship? That together they strive to understand the meaning of the historical events concerning one of them (analysand) while also trying to fathom what is happening between themselves in the here and now, and in the process considering plausible reasons for these disparate yet connected occurrences? Surely analyst and analysand are engaged in interpretive dialogue influenced by tentativeness and revision along the way to "insight".

Spence challenges the orthodox psychoanalytic community to retrieve the rich, figurative language that characterised Freud's depiction and description of the emotional lives and conflicts of the patients he treated. He laments the slippage of those provisional, "floating" metaphors for interpreting human experience into reified metaphors or explanatory systems, in his words "a blue print of the mind". Spence's project may be viewed as a kind of return to Freud, but only up to a point. For this is very much an American book. There is only one reference to Lacan and no mention is made of the British Object Relations theorists who have long since progressed from the conceptual confines of classical psychoanalytic theory.

The book is informed by an insider's knowledge of Freudian psychoanalysis as well as by an impressive familiarity with contemporary philosophy, especially philosophical hermeneutics. Consequently, Spence can juxtapose psychoanalytic concepts and those of philosophy and in the process offering fresh perspectives on psychoanalysis as an essentially interpretive endeavour, similar to others in the human sciences. Along the way he makes strikingly critical observations and commentaries on the assumptions and pronouncements of several famous Freudians, including Charles Brenner and Ralph Greenson (as well as their radical critic, Robert Langs!). Spence contends that these Freudians and their followers have resorted habitually - Ex Cathedra - to traditional psychoanalytic concepts (reified metaphors) to explain conclusively their patients' motivations and actions.

At times one gets the impression that Spence is "taking on" those orthodox Freudians so as to disclose publicly the error of their conservative ways, very much like a prosecuting attorney. Therefore, the book can sound rather polemical and tendentious.

However, Spence's familiarity with the essentially provisional, self-questioning, ironic nature of truly serious scholarship enables him to remain non-dismissive and intellectually curious while being sharply critical of his peers. Here he is served well by his chosen intellectual guides, Isaiah Berlin and Hans-Georg Gadamer, those two illustrious, non-adversarial historians and interpreters of (western) society, ideas, and their consequences. Both Berlin and Gadamer have consistently recognised and counselled the vital necessity of the interpretation of those narratives and stories that constitute the essentially contextual histories of peoples and intellectual movements.

After ably reviewing (interpreting) the metaphorical nature of psychoanalytical theory and practice Spence sketches a paradigm change in psychoanalysis in order to liberate it from its legacy of reified metaphor-as-explanation. For this purpose he examines in some detail the interesting parallel between psychoanalysis and law. He notes that both are interpretive practices questing plausible reasons for persons' actions. Furthermore, they are governed by rules of interpretation while not necessarily bound by them. Every new psychoanalytic or legal case may be similar to but definitely different from the one before. This means that the practitioners cannot rely entirely on the authority of received theory for practical guidance. Hence the need to interpret the reports or data as given and in the process suggesting provisional, plausible reasons for human action or behaviour.

We know that the practice of law is inherently public and publicly accountable, whereas that of psychoanalysis is entirely private and confidential. Spence wants psychoanalytic practice to become more publicly accountable and open to peer commentary, as happens in law. This is an interesting challenge in the context of the current politics of psychoanalysis, and the Freudian Metaphor can be read as a distinctly political work.

Having finished reading the book, one realises that for all his intellectual rigour, Donald Spence has produced what is in effect a passionately critical review of the assumptions and claims of classical psychoanalysis. Furthermore, and perhaps true to form as a postmodern critic of psychoanalysis, he has not articulated systematic proposals to rescue it from dead metaphor-as-explanation. That would have been to compromise his resolute stance against the seductions of positivistic science and method! Instead, he offers us a plausible, provisional critique characterised by fine, discriminating scholarship. Highly recommended to readers of this Journal.

Neville Singh