Book Review: Jung And Phenomenology

Consider the following statements:

'A psychology that is to be scientific can no longer afford to base itself on philosophical premises such as materialism and rationalism. If it is not to overstep its competence irresponsibly, it can only proceed phenomenologically and must abandon preconceived opinions.'

'If I want to understand an individual human being, I must lay aside all scientific knowledge of the average man and discard all theories in order to adopt a completely new and unprejudiced attitude. I can only approach the task of understanding with a free and open mind.'

Both these quotations are taken from the writings of Carl Gustav Jung, someone not usually associated with phenomenology. And yet, it is the thesis of this important text by Brooke that Jung was much more of a phenomenologist than is usually considered both by his adherents and his critics.

Although I am by no stretch of the imagination a 'Jungian', I have been fascinated for many years by the man's life and work, not least because, in reading many of Jung's texts I too, like Brooke, have come across numerous statements that make it clear that Jung was not only knowledgeable of phenomenology but that he also considered the central tenets of his theories to be drawn directly from Phenomenological enquiry.

Brooke's contention, elegantly and cogently argued throughout this highly intriguing text, is that although Jung's phenomenology was inconsistent and undisciplined throughout all of his writing, it remains central to a proper understanding of his thought. Further, Brooke argues that it is a failure of some significance on the part of phenomenologists to have remained so dismissive of Jung's work since much is contained within it that bears import to the furtherance of Phenomenological insight within psychology. In an attempt to convince the reader of the essential correctness of this claim, Brooke takes on the difficult task of reinterpreting Jung's psychology in Phenomenological terms. How well does Brooke succeed in this task? Without doubt, his is a serious and scholarly venture. He makes no wild claims, remains cautious in his conclusions, provides a wealth of insightful analysis that is stimulating to both the Jungian and the phenomenologist.

And yet, Brooke, too, concludes that Jung's acquaintance with phenomenology was in any event poor, he never made use of its methodological guidelines in a systematic and disciplined way. His success as a phenomenologist owes to his skill as a psychologist and hermenaut, but the necessary philosophical understanding was severely lacking. Thus the heart of the method, the Phenomenological reduction, was entered without sufficient rigour or self-criticism. The result is that he sees through rationalist and materialist prejudices, but not the Cartesian ontology that remains in his thought, even as his vision continually transcends it. (Brooke, 1991, p50)

This is, I believe, as straightforward an assessment of Jung's relationship to phenomenology as we can expect. I feel in debt to Brooke not simply for his having provided such, but for his great intellectual skill in delineating it both convincingly and with academic impartiality.

But there is much more to Brooke's argument than this. For, while he makes the Phenomenological gaps in Jung's approach eminently clear, more importantly he also provides the basis for an original reinterpretation and integration of Jungian and Phenomenological insight. This is, I believe, both worthwhile and exciting and it is my hope that Brooke himself will pursue this line of inquiry in future texts.

This is an important and valuable text which demands serious consideration. I wholeheartedly recommend it to all readers of this Journal.

Ernesto Spinelli