

of a short term existential-humanistic therapy. Each of the included case studies are analysed according to the integrative theory proposed by Schneider.

In sum this book is best appreciated as providing brief glimpses into the wide variety of permutations that existential therapy is evolving in America. Additionally the book can be read as a tribute to the contributions to American psychotherapy made by May as well as an illustration of one of the forms in which this work is being continued. In its proposal for an integration of therapies within a broadly existential-humanistic framework I have found much to be critical of as I believe much would be lost through ignoring the fundamental critiques offered by existential-phenomenological analysis of the theory and practise of psychotherapy across the field.

Michael Worrell

***Clinical Phenomenology and Cognitive Psychology by David Fewtrell and Kieron O'Connor. Published in 1995 by Routledge. 212+xi pages. Hb. £40.00.**

The relationship between thought and emotion remains a crucial quandary for both philosophy and cognitive science. Psychologists, since the rise of cognitive models derived from information-processing hypotheses, have tended to view the emotions as outcomes shaped by verbally-mediated thought activity. More recently, some authors have suggested that the opposite view may be just as likely, if not more helpful. Whatever the stance taken, its impact upon cognitive approaches to mental disturbance and dysfunction remains pivotal and problematic.

As an alternative system to such positivist-dominated methodologies, contemporary phenomenology posits a view which holds thought and emotion as complementary, mutually-influencing processes. As such, when placed within the realm of 'clinical' interventions, 'felt' experience and its interpreted meaning are taken to be as significant as the concomitant behaviours which can be more easily placed into a diagnostic framework. To employ the jargon: the noetic context of experience - be it functional or dysfunctional - is given equal significance to the noematic features emphasised by cognitive psychology.

That cognitive approaches have been unable or unwilling to address 'feeling states' as differentiable components of mental disturbance remains a central critique of cognitive psychology that has been voiced, among others, by a number of phenomenological psychologists. It is, therefore, a substantial development that the

two authors of this text have sought to address this impasse and to provide a number of tentative, though by no means insubstantial, steps towards its (partial) resolution. In doing so, they have written an important text that deserves the attention - and applause - of both cognitive and phenomenological psychologists.

While the total number of text pages is under 200, the sheer volume of detailed information packed into the ten chapters demands that the book be read slowly and with care. It does not make easy reading - but, at the same time, the challenge of perseverance is both rewarding and illuminating.

Readers of this Journal will find much of interest in the text's first chapter which provides an exemplary analysis of a number of key phenomenological arguments. Knowing full well how difficult these can be to convey to an audience that is likely to find such both novel and complex, I was deeply impressed by the clarity of the exposition. The five densely-packed pages summarising Jaspers' development of clinical phenomenology, to take but one example, should be read by all students of existential analysis. In a similar fashion, chapter three provides an invaluable outline of descriptively-focused analyses of the emotions. Chapters four through eight focus upon the examination of a number of major clinically-labelled dysfunctions - such as panic disorder (chapter four), psychogenic dizziness (chapter five), depersonalisation phenomena (chapter six), craving and addiction (chapter seven) and misidentification (chapter eight) - from both cognitive and phenomenologically-informed perspectives. Some readers may find the many (sometimes too many) reference sources cited to be as overly intrusive as they are helpful. And while the authors provide highly useful summaries at the end of each chapter, I must confess that, at times, I regretted that they did not choose to be more selective - and personally 'present' - in their discussions. While the final chapter provides a clear and constructive investigation of the potential 'common ground' between phenomenological and cognitive psychology, I would have appreciated an equally perceptive summary of the remaining points and issues of divergence and disagreement which remain.

Overall, however, I wish to impress upon the readers how much I admired this book. Without doubt, it opens pathways to mutually beneficial discourse. For those among us whose desire it is to develop phenomenological psychology so that it can more adequately address the principal concerns of psychology amongst which is that of 'psychopathology' - this text can be seen to be a much-needed starting point. That it raises more questions than it provides solu-

tions should not be taken as an overtly negative criticism: it has mapped out (some of) the terrain and, if for this alone, demands our acknowledgement and respect.

I recommend this text to all 'explorers' and look forward to future advancements in dialogue between cognitive and phenomenological psychologies. If such are forthcoming, as I expect they will - indeed, must - be, they will be enhanced significantly by the ground-work that Clinical Phenomenology and Cognitive Psychology has provided.

Ernesto Spinelli

***When Nietzsche Wept, A Novel of Obsession by Irvin D. Yalom, Penguin Books (1994) 306pp.**

Coming to Yalom's *When Nietzsche Wept* by way of *The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy* and *Existential Psychotherapy*, it is difficult not to feel some slight shock on beginning to read his latest volume. We have, though, had portents of Yalom's progression towards fiction in the shape of the oridly titled *Love's Executioner* - a work which has always seemed at least equal parts fact and fiction. Yalom readily confirms this suspicion with the full title (often passed over unseen) *and Other Tales of Psychotherapy*. This epithet appears little removed from *A Novel of Obsession* which completes the title of this last work.

Though not an entirely new animal, this book does represent a deeper and more sustained attempt to explore the genesis of therapy by means of the imagination and, as such, gives us pause for thought. There have been a number of such creatures let loose in recent years, some memorable, some not. Among them Susan Lund's *Raptus: A Novel About Beethoven* comes to mind as a treatment of the world of music, and Peter Ackroyd's *Hawksmoor* and *Chatterton* are eloquent on the realms of architecture and literature, respectively. This sub-genre is not, though, as new a development as might be thought. Yalom has hitched his star to an approach which, at least in the sense of comic imitation, can be traced back to antiquity. Aristophanes employed parodic devices, while *The Rape of the Lock* (mock epic), *Don Quixote* (mock picaresque), and *Northanger Abbey* (mock Gothic) continued the tradition.

In the late-nineteenth century pastiche, an off-shoot of parody, became popular. Such exercises in the stylistic imitation of specific writers permitted literary criticism via another means than direct analysis. Turn of the century literature also included transposed autobiography such as D.H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, a combina-